For IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 27, 1994
WASHINGTON -- Justice Brennan once wrote that: "We yet like to
believe that wherever the federal court sits, human rights under the
Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for consideration."
While many of us would still like to believe that, few would claim
that those words any longer reflect the reality of federal
jurisprudence. One of the continuing conflicts between the so-called
judicial activists and the so-called advocates of judicial restraint
relates to the scope of federal courts' jurisdiction and authority to
entertain complains of violations of constitutional principles.
Invoking doctrines of standing, justiciability, comity, abstention,
exhaustion, immunity and equitable jurisdiction, in addition to
narrow readings of statutory and constitutional language, the
Justices have greatly restricted access to the federal courts in
recent years.
Because of these access-denying doctrines, numerous litigants no
longer even bother to bring their constitutional claims to federal
forums, but either forego judicial remedies altogether or seek
redress in state courts. But, of course, cases continue to arise on
the edges of where current doctrine has left us; and decisions in
those cases tend to reflect the current division in the Court between
those Justices who believe the federal courts should be more
receptive to claims of constitutional deprivation and those who would
restrict even further the power and authority of federal judges to
provide redress for wrongs.
In the past Term, this division was represented by the case of
Albright v. Oliver, in which a majority ruled that a person who had
been arrested without reasonable cause on the fanciful accusation of
a known liar could not seek redress under federal law. This was one
more application of a unfortunate line of cases that have narrowed
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Civil Rights
Act.
In the coming Term, there are several cases that fall into this
category, and that test the judicial commitment to providing access
to justice in the federal courts.
One of these is Swint v. Chambers County, Ala, Commission, which
concerns a county's official liability for the allegedly
unconstitutional acts of its sheriff. It is an illustration of how a
civil rights plaintiff can get whip-sawed between technical doctrines
that restrict remedies against governmental entities. The problem in
Swint is that on the one hand the 11th Circuit held that under
Alabama law, the sheriff is a state, not a county, official thereby
excluding the county from liability for his official conduct; while,
on the other hand, prior Supreme Court rulings have precluded suits
against state agencies for their official misconduct on the basis of
the 11th Amendment immunity. The obvious danger from such a precedent
is that it allows states to take over more local governmental
functions and thus shield agencies from liability for their
employees' wrongdoing.
While Swint is certainly not of earth-shaking significance, it is
another illustration of the recent proliferation of doctrines that
restrict federal court redress for civil rights violations. And I
might add in that regard that a task force that includes
representatives of the ACLU has recently submitted to the Department
of Justice a 23-point legislative agenda to overrule a number of
recent Supreme Court decisions that restrict access to justice in the
federal courts and to expand generally the authority of federal
courts to entertain claims for violation of constitutional rights and
provide effective remedies.
There is another case before the court this Term that illustrates, in
a somewhat different way, recent trends to restrict access to federal
constitutional remedies. That is the Amtrak case, Lebron v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp. What this case reflects is the trend that
dates back to the shopping mall decision in 1972 to restrict the
definition of public forums for purposes of free speech under the
federal Constitution. The case involves the duty of Amtrak to accept
political advertising on its message boards at Penn Station in New
York City. Despite the fact that Amtrak is a creation of the United
States government, which owns all of its stock and appoints all
members of its board of directors, the 2d Circuit ruled that Amtrak
is not a government entity for purposes of the First Amendment.
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